Statement of Robert A. Georgine Before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations by Georgine, Robert A
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 
December 1993 
Statement of Robert A. Georgine Before the Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations 
Robert A. Georgine 
AFL-CIO 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Statement is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Statement of Robert A. Georgine Before the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Georgine, R. A. (1993). Statement of Robert A. Georgine before the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/343/ 
This statement is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/343 
j/ 
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. GEORGINE, PRESIDENT 
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO 
BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
Property of 
December 1 5 , 1993 MARTIN P. CATHERWOOD LIBRAE 
NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL 
Mr. Chairman and Members of t h e Commission. « T R I H AND 1*8011 RfclATifife 
C o r n e l l Univ>-T s't"v 
I want to thank the Commission for the opportunity to appear 
here today and to discuss with you the particular problems facing 
employees and many employers in the building and construction 
industry. The basic point I want to make is that certain changes 
in the law are essential in order to restore the stability of labor 
relations in this critical industry. 
The Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO 
is comprised of fifteen national and international unions that in 
the aggregate represent a membership in excess of four million 
workers. We are, therefore, vitally concerned with the need to 
preserve stable labor relations in the construction industry, in 
order to serve the needs of employers, employees and the public as 
well. 
I think it will be helpful if I describe at the outset the 
nature of the industry, and the particular difficulties that 
employers and employees in the construction industry have faced for 
many years. 
I 
The construction industry is one of the most vital to our 
nation's economy. It is responsible for building the roads, 
bridges, factories, offices, shops and homes, without which there 
would be no economy. According to the Department of Commerce, the 
income generated by the construction industry in 1992 was more than 
$212 billion. Using a different measure, also from the Department 
of Commerce, the value of all structures constructed in 1992 was 
$504.6 billion. Thus, this is a large and critical industry. When 
it flourishes, the overall economy flourishes. And when it 
suffers, it becomes a huge anchor on the overall economy. 
And yet, in spite of the size of the industry itself, 
virtually all of the firms in this industry are quite small. 
Department of Commerce figures also show that there are more than 
1,900,000 construction establishments. Of those, over 1,360,000 
were single proprietorships, with no employees. And of the 536,000 
firms that had employees, more than 430,000 have less than ten 
employees, and virtually all of them have less than twenty 
employees. In addition, as I will explain in a moment, the pattern 
of employment in the industry is one of intermittent and casual 
work. 
There are other features of the construction industry that 
make it complex and give rise to special problems concerning labor 
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relations in the industry. For example, as I explain in more 
detail in a memorandum of legal issues which is an attachment to my 
testimony, Congress made certain changes in the law in 1959. One 
of them allowed certain agreements between unions and "employers" 
in the construction industry. In 1959 agreements were typically 
between a construction union and a construction employer, because 
all such agreements were with business entities that met the 
technical definition of "employer." In more recent years, there 
have been significant structural changes in the construction 
industry, and the key management entity that is responsible for a 
construction project, and with which a union must deal, is often no 
longer an "employer" in the technical sense. Construction projects 
are frequently overseen directly by owners or developers of 
v. 
property, or by construction managers who may choose to hire no 
employees of their own. 
It is also important to understand how the structure of a 
typical construction project differs from one's view of employment 
in a manufacturing plant or a retail store. In the latter, there 
is a consistent identifiable employer, and a relatively stable 
complement of employees who work for that employer over a long 
period of time. The situation at a construction site is very 
different. Picture, if you will, a pyramid. At the top of the 
pyramid is the construction owner or developer for whom the 
building, mall, factory, etc., will be built. The owner or 
developer will then typically engage a general contractor, 
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construction manager or project manager, who will have oversight 
responsibilities for construction of the entire project. In the 
case of a general contractor, he may or may not hire employees 
performing work directly for him. 
At the next level, through a bidding process, the general 
contractor or project or construction manager will hire a series of 
contractors to perform various portions of the work. Because the 
construction of a building or other work is performed in stages, 
different portions of the work will be done at many different times 
over the course of the project. For example, ground clearing, 
excavation and preliminary electrical work are among the first 
items of work, and therefore the first construction trades 
employed. On the other hand, plumbing, painting and interior 
electrical work will come much later in the process. 
Moving further down the pyramid, the first tier contractors 
I've mentioned will do some of the work for which they've 
contracted themselves, but they will often subcontract other 
portions of the work to subcontractors. And, in turn, some of 
those subcontractors may even contract out a portion of their work 
to additional subcontractors. In short, on a single construction 
project there are many levels of interrelated employers, most of 
them working for short periods of time, and at different times 
during the life of the project. 
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For these reasons, and because construction contractors must 
bid for jobs, which are usually of short duration, never knowing 
which jobs they will obtain and which they will not, the 
construction industry is characterized by employees working for 
many different employers, at different sites and for different 
periods of time. The workforce, therefore, is constantly in a 
state of flux, changing from employer to employer, and even from 
geographic area to geographic area, depending on where work 
opportunities can be found. In the course of a year, an individual 
employee may work for many employers, and for none of them on a 
continuing basis. 
II 
An important feature of construction industry labor relations, 
because of these characteristics, is the "prehire" agreement. 
Employers usually enter into collective bargaining agreements 
covering a geographical area that coincides with the jurisdiction 
of a local union in the area. The agreement may run for several 
years and, since most building projects are of short duration, 
these prehire labor agreements often apply to jobs which have not 
been started when they are signed, and cover employees who are not 
yet hired. 
The prehire agreement, which has long been a cornerstone of 
bargaining in the construction industry, is quite simple in 
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concept. Because of the market realities of the construction 
industry, the work force of each employer fluctuates according to 
his success in securing bids. The more success -- the larger the 
work force; the less success -- the fewer workers required. At the 
end of each project, the employer may or may not have another 
project at which he can offer employment to his current employees. 
Thus, the employees in the construction industry represent one form 
of the "contingent workforce" about which this Commission has 
already been informed. In fact, the nature and age of the 
construction industry make it the prototype of the contingent work 
problem that in more recent years has infected other industries as 
well. 
By the same token, when an employer does succeed in a bid 
award, he must very quickly be able to secure skilled craft 
employees of all varieties, upon whose skills the employer must be 
able to immediately rely. The employer cannot afford to commence 
each new job with an on-the-job training program to develop skills. 
Also, the employer benefits not only from the availability of 
skilled workers through the hiring hall, but from the fact that the 
prehire agreement provides him with foreknowledge of his labor 
rates, which assists him in preparing his bid estimates. 
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Because of the nature of the industry, labor unions play a 
uniquely important role in dealing with employers and representing 
employees. The union negotiates, not on behalf of current 
employees of each employer, but rather, on behalf of the area-wide 
pool of hiring hall applicants who are available to work for the 
employers who are able to secure jobs in the area. Everyone on the 
out-of-work list is a potential employee for any employer who has 
a contract with the union. The area-wide hiring hall and the 
prehire agreement, which is the only workable collective bargaining 
agreement in the construction industry, characterized the 
construction industry long before the Wagner Act was conceived. 
Prehire agreements and area-wide hiring halls also have been 
responsible for many valuable benefits for construction workers and 
for the industry itself. For example, portable pension and welfare 
benefits have been created under such agreements for employees who 
are forced to move from job to job, and who otherwise would lack 
those benefits. Similarly, joint labor-management committees 
established under prehire agreements have been responsible for the 
development of apprenticeship and other training programs within 
the construction industry. The organized sector of the 
construction industry accounts for more than one-half of all 
apprentices in the United States, and it is the single largest 
source of apprenticeship programs, both in terms of the number of 
programs operated and the amount of dollar funding. These features 
of the bargaining relationship in the organized construction 
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industry are vitally important, since the vast majority of 
construction contractors are small employers who could not 
individually afford to provide training or to create pension or 
welfare plans. 
III 
As you can see, the construction industry is structured quite 
differently, and functions in a manner quite different, from most 
other industries. And it is because of those differences that the 
election procedures of the National Labor Relations Act simply do 
not work in the construction industry. The Wagner Act, as written 
in 1935, was intended to work quite well in the normal industrial 
setting characterized by a stable complement of employees who work 
for the same employer at the same plant location on a continuous 
basis. In that situation, there is a reasonable assumption that at 
the end of the election process, an identifiable employer and 
identifiable group of employees will remain for purposes of 
collective bargaining representation. 
In the construction industry the presumption is the opposite. 
Construction workers are not attached to a particular employer, but 
are attached to the industry itself within a geographical area. 
Accordingly, the NLRA's election procedures are simply unsuitable 
for the construction industry. In fact, construction workers were 
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organized for many decades before the NLRA was enacted in 1935, and 
those workers gained nothing of substance from the Wagner Act. 
It was because of its recognition that elections do not work 
in the construction industry, and that the prehire agreement is an 
essential ingredient of stable labor relations in that industry, 
that Congress in 1959 specifically authorized prehire agreements in 
the construction industry. Unfortunately, however, as explained in 
the memorandum-attached to my testimony, the present state of the 
law with respect to such agreements is grossly inequitable and 
requires Congressional action if stability in construction industry 
labor relations is to be assured. 
Because of two major developments, collective bargaining in 
the construction industry today is an endangered species, as it has 
become virtually impossible for construction workers to avail 
themselves of their statutorily protected rights to secure and 
maintain collective bargaining representation. 
A) The first of these developments is the increasing use of 
what is called "double-breasting." Double-breasted operations were 
originally a creation unique to the construction industry, but they 
are now seen in several other industries as well. The phrase 
"double-breasted" refers to a union construction company that 
establishes or acquires a non-union construction company, both of 
which are commonly owned and controlled. The new subsidiary then 
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performs the same work as the unionized company, in the same 
geographical area, but on a non-union basis, thereby avoiding the 
commitment made by the original employer to abide by the terms and 
conditions in his collective bargaining agreement. The phenomenon 
of double-breasted has occurred largely over the last twenty years 
and, today, is a openly acknowledged way of evading collective 
bargaining obligations. In November of 1981, Thomas E. Daley, 
President of the Associated General Contractors of America, in an 
interview with the Engineering News Record, described the 
motivation of double-breasting as follows: 
There is no union contractor I know of that by choice would go 
open shop for the hell of it. It's a lot easier for him to 
stay union as long as he can compete . . . but the minute he 
starts to lose work and his business is threatened, he will go 
double breasted or open shop, that's all there is to it. He 
has to. 
In the early 1970's the practice of double-breasting was rare. 
It was believed that such sham maneuvers violated the law. If it 
was done, it was done in the shadows to avoid detection. Since 
then, however, the practice has come out of the closet, and 
corporations publicly acknowledge their double-breasted status. 
For example, a 1981 survey conducted by the Engineering News Record 
disclosed that 77 of the 400 top construction companies in the 
country labeled themselves as double-breasted. Later, according to 
a report in the November 8, 1984, issue of Engineering News Record, 
27 of 50, or 54 percent of the largest contractors by dollar volume 
in 1983, were operating double-breasted. In 1986, figures among 
the very largest contractors illustrated even more dramatically the 
extent of double breasting. Of the top 25 contractors listed in an 
April 17, 1986, Engineering News Record story, 20 -- or .80 percent 
-- had double-breasted affiliates. That number has certainly 
increased in the years since that survey was taken. And among 
smaller contractors, it is even easier and more common to form 
double-breasted operations. 
It seems self evident that the law should not permit employers 
to avoid collective bargaining contracts by playing corporate shell 
games. We of the Building Trades are sympathetic to the need of 
our employers to remain competitive, and I am proud of our record 
over the last 15-20 years in actively pursuing the elimination of 
non-competitive work practices at the bargaining table. In our 
view, however, our national labor policy requires that workers and 
employers must together negotiate solutions to non-competitive 
aspects of collective bargaining agreements, and prohibits 
employers from unilaterally solving such problems through a 
decision to become double-breasted. 
B) In addition to the geometric growth of the sham device of 
double-breasting, the last quarter century has seen a tremendous 
growth in the non-union sector of the construction industry. 
Between 1968 and 1992, one author has reported that the percentage 
of construction work performed by non-union firms nationwide 
increased from approximately 20% to 60%. See Stephen F. Befort, 
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Labor Law and the Double-Breasted Employer, 1987 Wise. L. Rev. 67, 
n.3. In some trades, the percentage of work now done on a non-
union basis is even higher. It is easy to recognize that this 
trend works to the disadvantage of fair contractors who choose to 
abide by their collective bargaining agreements, and the employees 
who wish to receive the benefits provided by those agreements. 
What may not be so readily apparent is the damage that results 
to society from the increasing amount of work done non-union. I 
have already noted how collective bargaining agreements are 
responsible for portable pension and welfare plans that protect 
millions of organized construction workers. That is a benefit that 
cannot be matched in the non-union sector, and is frequently 
lacking completely. With the emphasis in today's headlines on the 
lack of adequate health care in this country, the danger presented 
by increasing numbers of construction workers with no or inadequate 
protection from health and welfare plans is obvious. 
I have also mentioned the apprenticeship and training programs 
provided under collective bargaining agreements. Today, the 
fifteen national building trades unions and their contractors spend 
more than $3 0 0 million on training programs, at both the national 
and local levels. At present, more than 180,000 apprentices each 
year participate in these training programs. Many other craft 
workers and foremen undergo additional training to upgrade their 
skills. In spite of recent rhetoric from some non-union contractor 
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organizations, the simple fact is that training programs are 
virtually non-existent in the non-union sector or, where they do 
exist, don't come close to providing the level of instruction and 
training provided under collectively-bargained programs. Given the 
predictions of a severe shortage of skilled workers for the rest of 
this decade and into the next century, the present journeyman and 
apprenticeship programs provided by the organized construction 
industry provide the best hope of meeting the manpower needs of the 
industry in the years ahead. Workers benefit, the industry 
benefits and society benefits from the role that the organized 
construction industry has played -- and will continue to play --in 
the training of skilled workers. 
Let me mention another area where the growth of the non-
union construction sector has serious consequences for employees^ 
and for society. The present condition of occupational safety and 
health in the construction industry is a scandal. According to 
government figures, each year an average of more than 2,100 deaths 
and 250,000 serious injuries occur in construction workplaces. 
Moreover, this situation has become progressively worse during the 
last twenty years. In 1970, construction workers constituted 4% of 
the total workforce and accounted for 15% of the total fatalities. 
Today, construction workers constitute 5.5% of the workforce but 
account for 25% of the fatalities. 
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Once again, it is the building trades unions and their 
contractors that have worked jointly to sponsor comprehensive 
safety and health programs in order to protect the lives of workers 
and to reduce the enormous losses that result from accidents. 
Unlike the non-union sector, these safety programs have been 
instrumental in preventing accidents and have resulted in savings 
to the industry of approximately 10% of the total cost of 
construction projects. 
The greatest single safeguard against accidents is worker 
training, and the record is clear that it is the organized sector 
that provides superior safety training to workers. According to 
one study, published in the November 1990 Journal of.Occupational 
Medicine, entitled "Safety Performance Among Union and Nonunion 
Workers in the Construction Industry," the superior training given 
to union workers results in safer job sites. The study found clear 
evidence that union workers had received more safety training, and 
had a better safety record, than their non-union counterparts. 
IV 
The sum of the plight faced by building trades workers and 
their unions is this: Construction unions provide a number of 
significant benefits, through the collective bargaining process, 
for the employees they represent. It goes without saying that 
these benefits increase the labor costs of unionized construction 
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contractors, and places them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-
vis non-union contractors. That problem is magnified by the fact 
that construction is an industry that new companies can easily 
enter. As I mentioned at the beginning of my testimony, the 
overwhelming majority of construction companies -- 73 percent --
consist only of their owner. 
The problems that arise from the nature of the industry itself 
are then compounded by developments in the law. Since 1973, the 
law has allowed -- even encouraged -- union companies to operate on 
a non-union basis by becoming double-breasted. The law also allows 
a union company to stop recognizing the union and to become totally 
non-union as soon as its collective bargaining agreement expires. 
Finally, the law ties our hands in attempting to respond to these 
actions. We cannot exert pressure on property owners, general 
contractors or construction managers, because they are considered 
untouchable "neutrals" under the secondary boycott section of the 
law -- even though, as I indicated earlier -- all of the business 
operations on a construction site are closely interrelated. And, 
even the non-union breast of a unionized company is considered a 
"neutral" under the law. 
The bottom line is that building trades unions and the 
employees they represent face a number of problems that are 
directly related to the current inequitable state of our federal 
labor law. The result of these problems is that the system of 
15 
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collective bargaining in the construction industry, which has been 
the basis of stability and productivity in that industry for a 
century, has been seriously undermined and is at grave risk. 
Fundamental legislative changes are necessary in order to redress 
this situation, and I have described those changes in some detail 
in the memorandum attached to my testimony. 
Thank you. 
v. 
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Because of the nature of the construction industry, and the 
particular difficulties that employers and employees in the 
construction industry have faced for many years, Congress sought a 
legislative solution for those problems in 1959, In order to 
accommodate the terms of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to 
the nature of this industry. Unfortunately, the 1959 Congressional 
effort has been largely undermined in the intervening years. 
In my testimony before the Commission, I noted the unusual 
nature of the construction industry, which is characterized by many 
small employers, with jobs of short duration, and a casual 
workforce seeking employment from many different employers at 
different times and locations. It is, essentially, an employment 
pattern of seasonality and intermittence.-1 My testimony also 
-' In 1959, Congress recognized this pattern of employment in 
the construction industry, and used it as a basis for the 
construction industry amendments to the Act that are discussed 
later in this paper. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. , 
at 27, 28 (1959), 1 LMRDA Leg. Hist. 423-24. 
noted the significance of the "prehire" agreement and the use of 
area-wide hiring halls as essential ingredients in serving the 
needs of employers and employees in this industry. 
II 
In order to understand the predicament that construction 
workers find themselves in today, one must review the history of 
the National Labor Relations Act. The Wagner Act was the first 
federal statute to establish what has become an immutable principle 
of American law -- the right of workers to form unions and bargain 
collectively. But one need not be a scholar in American history to 
know that collective bargaining and union organization did not 
V. 
begin in this country with enactment of the Wagner Act. Unions had 
been a part of the fabric of our society long before 1935. 
But in 1935, Congress was faced with a national crisis in 
labor relations to which it was compelled to respond. That crisis 
was created by the great industrial union organizing campaigns in 
the largest and most anti-union industries in this country. The 
great tide of industrial organizing had, for the first time, 
brought employers in the steel, auto, rubber and other major 
industries to the realization that federal labor legislation might 
be in their own best interest in the face of sit-down strikes, mass 
picketing, product boycotts and a myriad of other organizing 
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techniques. Congress responded to this unrest with the Wagner Act 
which, as you know, in Section 7 promises that: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.... 
The Act, as written in 1935, was structured with these major 
industries in mind. It was intended to work quite well in the 
normal industrial setting characterized by a stable complement of 
employees who work for the same employer at the same plant location 
on a continuous basis. In the construction industry, however, as 
noted in my testimony, the situation is very different. 
Construction workers are not attached to a particular employer, but 
are in fact attached to the industry itself, centered around the 
union hiring hall, within a geographical area. Accordingly, it was 
determined early in the history of the NLRA that the normal 
representation election procedures simply do not work in the 
construction industry. 
Because of these unique characteristics, the NLRB refused to 
assert jurisdiction over the construction industry from 1935 to 
1947. Elections were not conducted in the industry, and prehire 
agreements, although technically a violation of the Wagner Act 
because they are signed before the employer has a representative 
complement of employees, continued as the norm. In its 
deliberations on the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress showed no 
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special concern over the Board's treatment of elections and prehire 
agreements in the construction industry. Congress did, however, 
exhibit a concern over secondary boycotts in all industries, and 
dealt with them by enacting Section 8(b)(4). Accordingly, after 
the passage of Taft-Hartley, the Board felt compelled to assert 
jurisdiction over the construction industry for all purposes, 
including representation elections. 
In 1948, the NLRB carried out a pilot program of construction 
industry elections under the union shop authorization provisions of 
the Act. The result was that, even with the full cooperation of 
the unions and employers involved, the election costs were so 
staggering that the General Counsel ultimately recommended that the 
Board ignore the statute with respect to elections in this 
industry. 
Commencing in 1951, and in several sessions of Congress 
thereafter, bills to amend the Taft-Hartley Act to deal with unique 
aspects of the construction industry were introduced. These 
modifications were ultimately enacted in 1959 as part of Title VII 
of the Landrum-Griffin Act, also known as the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"). 
Unfortunately, however, in spite of Congressional efforts in 
1959, collective bargaining in the construction industry today is 
an "endangered species" because it is virtually impossible for 
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workers in our industry to avail themselves of their statutorily 
protected right to secure and maintain collective bargaining 
representation. In the last 20 years, interpretations of the law 
have ignored the special characteristics of the construction 
industry and defeated Congress' desire to facilitate collective 
bargaining in that industry. 
Ill 
In order to permit the continuation of the prevailing 
practices in the construction industry, and to accommodate the 
terms of the NLRA to conditions in the construction industry, 
Congress in 1959 enacted two provisions specifically tailored to 
v, 
the nature of labor relations in this industry. Unfortunately, 
much of that Congressional effort has since been undone. 
A) The first of the sections was 8(f), which for the first 
time authorized prehire agreements in the construction industry. 
Thus, the mechanism that had so well served the interest of both 
workers and employers in the construction industry was at last 
formally protected by the law. Section 8(f), however, while 
authorizing prehire agreements, preserved employee free choice. It 
provided that, while prehire agreements did not violate the Act, 
such agreements could not serve as a bar to an election petition 
filed pursuant to Section 9 of HIP Art. This is a specific 
safeguard to allow employees to seek a Board election and to reject 
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any prehire bargaining representative with which they are 
dissatisfied. 
We believe that this is a uniquely appropriate accommodation 
for our industry. Workers are assured that their unions can 
negotiate agreements on their behalf which will establish the wages 
and conditions available to them if the market conditions provide 
employment. They are also assured that, through those agreements, 
employers can be required to seek workers through the hiring hall 
and, accordingly, workers need register with only one source of 
employment instead of wandering from project to project, day in and 
day out, seeking work opportunities. In addition, a number of 
specific and valuable benefits for construction workers have been 
provided through the use of prehire agreements. These include 
portable pension and welfare benefits for employees who 
continuously move from job to job; apprenticeship and other 
training programs that produce the highly skilled craft employees 
needed in this industry; and safety and health programs designed to 
reduce worksite dangers of accidents and exposure to harmful 
substances. I have described the nature and value of these 
benefits in more detail in my testimony before the Commission. 
The prehire system of collective bargaining, validated by 
Congress, served the industry well until the early 1970's, when the 
Labor Board issued a series of decisions which undermined the 
viability of prehire agreements. In R. J. Smith Construction Co., 
6 
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191 NLRB 693 (1971), the Board held that employers who enter into 
prehire agreements were free to terminate those agreements at any 
time, unless and until the union could establish that it 
represented a majority of the employer's employees. 
In 1987, the Board modified that approach and announced new 
rules governing the operation of prehire agreements in the 
construction industry. John Deklewa and Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 
(1987) . Under the new rule, although employers cannot terminate a 
prehire agreement during its term, they are free to repudiate their 
bargaining relationship immediately upon the expiration of the 
agreement. Or, if the employer wishes, it can begin bargaining for 
a new contract, but then withdraw from the bargaining and end its 
relationship with the union if the employer is unhappy with the 
progress of the negotiations. These latter parts of the Deklewa 
rule are contrary to the law in all other industries, and contrary 
to the effect which Congress intended to give to prehire agreements 
through its enactment of Section 8(f) in 1959. You do not have to 
be a legal scholar to know that a rule that lets one party simply 
walk away from his bargaining relationship is wrong by any 
standard. Moreover, the result of the rule is that Section 8(f) 
agreements have an inferior status to Section 9(a) agreements in 
other industries. Yet, in reviewing the history of Section 8(f), 
a Senate Report in 1987 noted expressly that, 
Congress [in 1959] intended for Section 8(f) of the LMRDA to 
accord pre-hire agreements in the construction industry the 
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same status and to have the same force and effect under the 
Act as Section 9(a) agreements [in all other industries.] . [S. 
Rep. No. 100-314, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 8.] 
The present state of the law under Section 8(f) is, therefore, 
inequitable and indefensible, as well as contrary to what Congress 
intended in 1959. Stability in labor relations cannot be returned 
to this industry without corrective Congressional action. 
B. Unfortunately, the damage that the NLRB has done to 
collective bargaining in the construction industry goes beyond its 
misinterpretation of Section 8 (f) and the use of the prehire 
agreement. The NLRB has provided a reluctant construction employer 
with another device to avoid its collective bargaining obligations 
and to deny workers the benefits of union representation. The 
Board has done so by allowing employers to establish what are 
called "double-breasted" operations. Double-breasted operations 
were originally a phenomenon unique to the construction industry. 
They are now used in several other industries as well. Although we 
cannot identify who coined the term "double-breasted" to identify 
these types of construction operations, it refers to a union 
construction company and a non-union construction company, both of 
which are commonly owned and controlled. 
Until the early 1970's the term "double-breasted" was 
virtually unheard of. Today, it has become an easy way for 
employers to avoid their obligation to abide by collective 
bargaining agreements. The beginning of the tremendous growth of 
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double-breasted operations coincides with, and is in large part 
attributable to, the NLRB's 1973 decision in a case known as Peter 
Kiewit Sons' Company, 206 NLRB 562. In that case, Kiewit was bound 
to a collective bargaining agreement with the Operating Engineers 
in the State of Oklahoma for the performance of highway 
construction work. The contract had been in effect for years. In 
1972, Kiewit brought a separate corporate subsidiary known as South 
Prairie Construction Company into the State of Oklahoma for the 
purpose of bidding on highway construction work for the first time 
on a non-union basis. South Prairie immediately began to secure 
such work and refused to recognize and abide by the Operating 
Engineers' collective bargaining agreement. Kiewit, in the 
meantime, withdrew from bidding for highway construction work in 
v. 
the State. 
Kiewit made no attempt to disguise its purpose. It had 
decided that it would be more profitable to ignore, than to comply 
with, its commitment to perform highway construction work in 
Oklahoma under its collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, 
Kiewit shifted the work previously performed by employees of its 
union company over to the employees of its non-union company. 
Again, it does not take a legal scholar to recognize that a system 
which permits an employer to evade his written agreement by merely 
setting up a new company to perform the same work, in the same 
area, on a non-union basis, is just plain wrong. That was not what 
Congress had in mind in 193 5 when it guaranteed workers the right 
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to bargain collectively, or in 1959 when it attempted to facilitate 
collective bargaining in the construction industry. 
Nevertheless, the NLRB found that the Act permitted Kiewit to 
evade his bargaining agreement, primarily because Kiewit and South 
Prairie each "independently" controlled its own labor relations 
policies. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
however, rejected that conclusion. It found that common control of 
labor relations was not necessarily the critical factor and 
emphasized the importance of seeing whether there was an "arms-
length" relationship between the two employers. Operating 
Engineers Local 62 7 v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975) . 
Although the Supreme Court upheld that part of the D. C. Circuit's 
decision, it sent the case back to the Board to determine whether, 
even if Kiewit and South Prairie constituted a single entity, the 
employees of each company constituted separate bargaining units. 
South Prairie Construction Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 627, 
425 U. S. 800 (1976). Not surprisingly, in its second opinion, the 
Board decided that even though the two companies constituted a 
single entity, they were separate bargaining units, and thus it 
reached the same conclusion it had originally reached, i.e., the 
Operating Engineers' agreement did not apply. Peter Kiewit Sons, 
Inc., 231 NLRB 76 (1977). 
The Kiewit case is the landmark case on double-breasting. It 
is the road map for employers seeking to escape their collective 
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bargaining obligations by establishing non-union operations. In 
fact, Professor Steven G. Allen, a professor at North Carolina 
State University and a well-respected student of the construction 
industry, concluded earlier this year that the Kiewit decision is 
significantly responsible for the decline in union density in the 
construction industry. Allen, Unit Costs, Legal Shocks, and 
Unionization in Construction, April 1993 (paper scheduled for 
inclusion in a 1994 research publication of the Industrial 
Relations Research Association). The 1973 Kiewit decision 
contained a statement which at the time was incorrect, but which 
has become a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
It is not uncommon in the construction industry for the same 
interests to have two separate organizations; dne to handle 
contracts performed under union conditions, and the other 
under non-union conditions. 
206 NLRB at 562. 
By 1987, the House of Representatives recognized the need to 
outlaw this destructive practice, and passed the Building and 
Construction Industry Labor Law Amendments of 1987, which was 
designed to insure that employers in the construction industry 
abide by their collective bargaining agreements, and to preclude 
such employers from avoiding those contractual obligations by 
utilizing non-union related business entities to perform the same 
work which is covered by their collective bargaining agreements. 
In early 19RR, the bill was cleared by the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Human Resources but, because of the pressures of the 
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presidential election in 1988, the bill did not reach the Senate 
floor. Later versions of the bill have been introduced but have 
not moved through either House. Nevertheless, the problems 
addressed by the bill remain critical. 
In the same 1987 Senate Report, cited above, the Committee on 
Labor and Human Resources said that, in 
the 'double breasting' line of cases, the Board has drawn a 
blueprint for construction industry employers who wish to 
evade the obligations stated in collective bargaining 
agreements by establishing so-called 'double-breasted' 
companies. The Committee has received copies of contractor 
"how to" manuals that outlined the steps contractors could 
take to operate double breasted in a common geographical area 
and avoid any criminal or Labor Board prosecution ... There is 
no real cessation or diminution of the employers' activity in 
the industry, merely the termination of the right^of employees 
to participate in that activity under the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement. The Board has placed its 
imprimatur on this double-breasting device, and the result has 
been to spawn an even greater use of this technique. [S. Rep. 
No. 100-314, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. , at 16.] 
Today, double-breasting is an openly acknowledged way of 
evading collective bargaining obligations. In my testimony, I have 
cited a number of statistics from employer sources that reveal 
dramatically the growth of double-breasting in recent years. I 
also stated my belief, which seems to me a truism, that employers 
should not be allowed to avoid their responsibilities under 
collective bargaining agreements, and to deprive employees of the 
benefits provided by those agreements, by playing corporate shell 
games. Accordingly, when a union contractor forms a subsidiary to 
perform the same work, in the same geographical area, but on a non-
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union basis, the law must provide that the union company violates 
the NLRA by refusing to apply the agreement to both operations. 
The huge loophole presently provided by the law on double-breasting 
is in immediate need of a Congressional remedy if labor stability 
is to be returned in the construction industry, and if employee 
free choice is not to be so easily defeated by the sham device of 
double-breasting. 
Although some unions have attempted to combat the double-
breasting device by negotiating contractual provisions that 
prohibit the practice, or seek to compel application of the 
collective bargaining agreement to the newly established non-union 
shop, those efforts have been thwarted on the grounds that such 
V. 
causes are considered unlawful "hot cargo" agreements under Section 
8(e) of the Act. That is a subject that requires some explanation, 
and the subject which we now address. 
C) To understand the second part of the special treatment 
that Congress accorded the construction industry in 1959, we must 
review briefly the "secondary boycott" provisions of the National 
Labor Relations Act. Prior to 1959, Section 8(b)(4) was the only 
secondary boycott section of the Act. 
What became Section 8(e) was, to a large extent, a 
Congressional response to two Supreme Court decisions: Local 1976, 
Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door) , 357 U.S. 93 (1958), and NLRB v. 
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Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 
(1951) . In Sand Door the Court held that Section 8(b) (4) did not 
permit a union to coerce an employer's compliance with an agreement 
not to handle non-union or struck goods, but it also held that the 
Act did permit an employer and a union to enter into a hot cargo 
agreement and voluntarily to comply with it. 357 U.S. at 108. In 
Denver Building Trades the Court held that a general contractor and 
its subcontractor working on a jobsite were separate entities under 
Section 8 (b) (4) and that a union violated that section by picketing 
and conducting a strike designed to compel the general contractor 
to cease doing business with a subcontractor on the same job. 
Thus, when Congress convened in 1959, unions in the 
construction industry could not picket, strike or otherwise coerce 
one employer in the construction industry in order to influence 
another employer, even if the two employers were a general 
contractor and its subcontractor working on the same jobsite. But, 
a voluntary agreement between a union and an employer in that 
industry could not be deemed unlawful because of its secondary 
objectives or effects. Throughout the legislative history of the 
LMRDA there are discussions about the efforts to overrule both of 
those decisions. Ultimately, Congress did not overrule Denver 
Building Trades so as to permit economic activity directed against 
secondary employers in the construction industry. Congress did 
overrule Sand Door and prohibit voluntary agreements with secondary 
objectives, but it created an exemption from that prohibition for 
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the construction industry as a partial substitute for the attempt 
to overrule the Denver Building Trades decision. 
The new prohibition took the form of Section 8(e), which 
prohibits secondary "hot cargo" agreements generally and was 
designed to eliminate the loophole created by the Sand Door 
decision. In enacting Section 8(e), however, Congress recognized 
that a specific exception had to be made for the construction 
industry from its prohibition of "hot cargo" agreements. The 
construction industry proviso to Section 8 (e) expressly allows 
agreements between unions and employers in the construction 
industry that relate to the contracting of work at construction 
sites, even if those agreements are deemed "secondary" and would 
otherwise fall within the ban of Section 8(e). 
This explicit protection given to typical construction 
industry contracting and subcontracting agreements has been largely 
diminished in two respects, however. First, in 1959, it was 
adequate to authorize agreements between a labor organization and 
an "employer" in the construction industry, because all such 
agreements were with business entities that met the technical 
definition of "employer." With structural changes in the 
construction industry in recent years, however, the key management 
entity that is responsible for a construction project, and with 
whom a union often must deal, is no longer necessarily an 
"employer" in the construction industry. Frequently, construction 
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projects are now overseen by owners or developers directly, or by 
construction managers. 
This problem can be corrected a very simple change in the 
construction industry proviso, to permit agreements between a labor 
organization in the construction industry and "an employer, owner, 
developer, construction manager or other business entity," that 
relates to the contracting of work at a construction site. Such an 
amendment to the 8 (e) proviso would do no more than recognize the 
changes in business forms and operations that have occurred in the 
last thirty-four years, while still preserving the intent that 
underlies the proviso. 
v. 
Second, the Labor Board has given a very narrow interpretation 
to union efforts which are designed to preserve the work of the 
employees they represent. These work preservation efforts are 
deserving of greater support through a more liberal interpretation 
of the law. This point requires some elaboration. 
As mentioned earlier, the proviso to Section 8(e) comes into 
play only if an agreement in the construction industry is first 
found to be "secondary" and therefore within the scope of the main 
prohibition in Section 8 (e) . On the other hand, if an agreement is 
deemed to be for the purpose of preserving the work of employees 
represented by the union and is therefore considered "primary," it 
is entirely outside the scope of 8(e) . National Woodwork 
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Manufacturers Association v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Many so-
called "hot cargo" agreements in the construction industry are in 
fact intended to preserve the work of employees covered by those 
agreements, and should be considered primary. 
• 
In two related decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1980 
and 1985, that Court announced a broad standard for what 
constitutes primary "work preservation" agreements. See ILA I and 
II, NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Association, 447 U.S. 490 
(1980), and 473 U.S. 61 (1985). Specifically, the Supreme Court 
noted in ILA II that a union's effort to preserve jobs in the face 
of a perceived threat to those jobs is primary, even if that effort 
has secondary effects. A desire "to preserve work in the face of 
a threat to jobs" is a "clear[ly] primary objective." 373 U.S. at 
79. 
Over the years, however, construction industry contracting and 
subcontracting agreements, whose purpose is "to preserve work in 
the face of a threat to jobs," have routinely been viewed as 
secondary. One such example is an agreement that prohibits or 
restricts the use of double-breasted operations by contractors in 
signed agreement with the union. Although the use of double-
breasted shops poses a clear and present danger to the work force 
represented by the union, the Board, using an unrealistic and 
restrictive concept of "work preservation, " almost automatically 
views such agreements as secondary, and then examines the question 
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of whether the agreement is nevertheless saved by the 8(e) proviso. 
Thus, eight years after the Supreme Court's decision in I LA 
II, the law governing the validity of "work preservation" 
agreements in the construction industry remains more restrictive 
than the standard announced in that case by the Supreme Court. We 
believe, therefore, that an amendment to Section 8(e) is needed to 
protect legitimate work preservation efforts by incorporating into 
the statute the ILA standard for such efforts. Moreover, for the 
reasons explained earlier, the work preservation object of those 
efforts must be viewed in the context of the area labor pool served 
by the labor organization and its hiring hall, rather than by a 
strict bargaining unit test that is utilized in other industries 
V. 
but is unworkable in this industry. 
IV 
There is an additional problem that weakens the rights of 
employees in the construction industry. That problem results 
directly from the erroneous decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 
341 U.S. 675 (1951) . In that 1951 case, a 6-3 majority of the 
Supreme Court held that a general contractor and its subcontractors 
working on the same job site were separate entities under Section 
8(b) (4) , and that a union that had a dispute with one subcontractor 
violated that section by picketing to compel the general contractor 
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to cease doing business with that subcontractor. That decision 
ignored the realities of the construction industry and, in 
particular, the close working relationship and interdependence 
among all contractors and subcontractors on a single construction 
site. It also ignored a fundamental fact of construction, namely, 
that what is critical to construction workers is the award of jobs 
to unionized contractors, and that this process is controlled by 
owners, developers, general contractors and construction managers. 
This essential aspect of the construction industry reveals that, in 
fact, all work on a construction site is part of the same process, 
and that none of these entities is uninvolved in the process or a 
so-called "neutral" under Section 8(b)4. It is because of that 
reality that the Denver Building Trades decision should be 
reversed. And it is because of the same reality that the 8 (e) 
proviso was necessary in 1959, and, as explained above, needs 
amendment today in order to close the loophole for those who 
control the job flow but do not meet the definition of "employer." 
Legislative efforts were made throughout the 1950s to overrule 
the Denver Building Trades decision. Even President Eisenhower's 
1959 message to Congress, in which he recommended the labor reform 
legislation that ultimately became the LMRDA, urged the enactment 
of provisions that would permit secondary activity in certain 
circumstances in the construction industry. Bills were introduced 
in both Houses in 1959 that would have overruled the Denver 
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Ruilding Trades decision, but what ultimately emerged was the 
compromise that added the construction industry proviso to Section 
8(e) . 
In 1961 the Supreme Court decided that, in the industrial 
sector, picketing could be conducted at a common work site using 
what was called a "related work" test. Electrical Workers (IUE) 
Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961) . The Labor Board later 
ruled, however, that the General Electric rule announced by the 
Supreme Court for other industries did not apply to disputes with 
general contractors in the construction industry. Markwell & 
Hartz, Inc., 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enforced, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 
1967), cert, denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968). 
The result of these decisions is a glaring disparity between 
economic rights of employees in the construction industry on the 
one hand, and in all other industries on the other. Subsequent 
legislative efforts were made to reverse the Denver Building Trades 
decision, and Congress ultimately accomplished that purpose in 1975 
by enacting a new law to protect the economic rights of labor in 
the construction industry, H.R. 5900, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
After twenty-four years of trying, both Houses of Congress agreed 
to amend Section 8(b) (4) to permit picketing at the common site of 
a construction project, and expressly overruled the Denver Building 
Trades decision. A second part of that bill provided for a 
national dispute resolution procedure that could be invoked in 
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certain local bargaining situations in the construction industry. 
The objective of this portion of the bill was to provide a more 
orderly and efficient system of bargaining in the industry. In 
spite of both private and public assurances that he would sign such 
a bill if enacted by the Congress, President Ford vetoed it. 
As a result of President Ford's veto, Congress' will in 
accommodating the Act to the needs of the construction industry was 
once again thwarted. Now, eighteen years later, the disparity in 
economic rights between employees in the construction industry and 
those in other industries is greater than ever. In short, a wrong 
was committed in 1951, Congress has since recognized the need to 
right that wrong, but that corrective action has never been 
finalized. That action must be taken if employees in the 
construction industry are to be able to exercise the same rights as 
their fellow employees in other sectors of the economy. 
V 
The Building and Construction Trades Department fully supports 
the efforts of the AFL-CIO to achieve a meaningful version of labor 
law reform, one that will effectively guarantee employee rights and 
assure a more effective workplace. As AFL-CIO President Kirkland 
has eloquently stated here, in many ways the protections of the 
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Wagner Act in 1935 have been rendered ineffective, and there is an 
urgent need of a major overhaul. 
Within the building and construction industry, workers and 
their unions are met with an additional set of industry-specific 
problems that are directly related to the current state of the 
inequity of our federal labor law. These problems include the 
blatant use of double-breasting; the right of an employer to walk 
away from the- union and the employees it represents once the 
contract expires; and unrealistic restrictions on the right of 
unions to respond to such actions. These problems have resulted in 
serious damage to labor relations in the construction industry 
today. Moreover, these current conditions dramatically reveal how 
Congressional efforts to bring order and stability to labor 
relations in this vital industry have been thwarted. Accordingly, 
any changes in our basic labor laws must include provisions that 
will effectively remedy these conditions. 
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